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The question presented in this appeal is whether the 
more favorable mandatory minimum prison sentences 
imposed by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (the “FSA” or 
the “Act”) apply retroactively to defendants, like Kenneth 
Dixon, who committed their crimes before the Act became 
law, but who were sentenced afterwards.  We hold that the 
FSA does apply in this instance.  The language of the Act 
reveals Congress‟s intent that courts no longer be forced to 
impose mandatory minimums sentences that are both 
indefensible and discriminatory.  Therefore, we will vacate 
the judgment of the District Court and remand for 
resentencing. 
I. 
From November 2007 until December 2008, Dixon 
conspired to distribute approximately fifty-one grams of crack 
cocaine.  On March 19, 2010, he pled guilty to conspiracy to 
distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 846, and receipt and possession of an 
unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d).  At 
the time of Dixon‟s offense, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1986 (the “1986 Act”) mandated penalties for powder cocaine 
and crack cocaine according to a 100:1 ratio, creating a 
pronounced disparity between offenders convicted of 
possessing crack cocaine and those convicted of possessing 
powder cocaine.  More precisely, a conviction involving five 
grams of crack cocaine resulted in the same five-year 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment as a conviction 
involving 500 grams of powder cocaine.  Similarly, a 
conviction involving fifty grams of crack cocaine resulted in 
the same ten-year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment 
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as a conviction for 5,000 grams of powder cocaine.  21 
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) & (B)(iii) (2006). 
The initial justification for this difference in treatment 
– that crack cocaine was more dangerous and addictive than 
powder cocaine – repeatedly came under attack as the 
implications of the disparity emerged.  See Kimbrough v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 85, 97-99 (2007) (describing the 
United States Sentencing Commission‟s criticism of the 100:1 
ratio).  This controversy resulted from data suggesting that 
African-American defendants received disproportionately 
higher sentences for crack cocaine offenses than white 
defendants convicted of powder cocaine offenses, even 
though the drugs were essentially the same substance.  See 
generally Knoll D. Lowney, Smoked Not Snorted:  Is Racism 
Inherent in Our Crack Cocaine Laws?, 45 Wash. U. J. Urb. & 
Contemp. L. 121 (1994).  The Sentencing Commission 
identified major problems with the crack/powder disparity, 
namely that the assumptions regarding violence and 
addictiveness were unfounded, that it did not effectively 
punish major drug traffickers, and that it imposed severe 
sentences primarily upon African-American offenders.  See 
Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 98 (summarizing the Sentencing 
Commission‟s efforts to alter 100:1 crack/powder disparity). 
 Prior to Dixon‟s sentencing hearing, however, 
Congress passed the FSA, and it became law when the 
President signed it on August 3, 2010.  See Hays & Co. v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 
1151 n.1 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Where no specific effective date is 
provided, the provision or statute becomes effective upon the 
date the president signs the bill.”).  Congress described the 
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FSA as “[a]n Act To restore fairness to Federal cocaine 
sentencing.”  Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-220, 
§ 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010).  The FSA reduced the 
crack/powder ratio to approximately 18:1.  According to the 
Act, the five-year mandatory minimum penalty for possessing 
crack cocaine is not triggered until a person possesses twenty-
eight grams and the ten-year mandatory minimum penalty for 
possessing crack cocaine is not triggered until a person 
possesses 280 grams (the triggers for powder cocaine remain 
500 grams and 5,000 grams, respectively).  Id. 
Recognizing the need to connect the new mandatory 
minimum penalties with the Sentencing Guidelines, Section 8 
of the Act vests the Sentencing Commission with emergency 
authority to: 
(1) promulgate the guidelines, policy 
statements, or amendments provided for in this 
Act as soon as practicable, and in any event not 
later than 90 days after the date of enactment of 
this Act . . . and 
(2) pursuant to the emergency authority 
provided under paragraph (1), make such 
conforming amendments to the Federal 
sentencing guidelines as the Commission 
determines necessary to achieve consistency 
with other guideline provisions and applicable 
law. 
Id. § 8.  New, FSA-compliant, sentencing Guidelines 
implementing the 18:1 ratio went into effect on November 1, 
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2010.  See Notice of a Temporary, Emergency Amendment to 
Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,188 
(Oct. 27, 2010); U.S.S.G. supp. to app. C, amend. 748 (Supp. 
2010) (amending U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)) (effective Nov. 1, 
2010).
1
  Additionally, Congress directed the Sentencing 
Commission to “study and submit to Congress a report 
regarding the impact of the changes in Federal sentencing law 
under this Act[.]”  FSA § 10. 
Under the 1986 Act, Dixon faced a mandatory 
minimum of ten years‟ imprisonment because he possessed 
more than fifty grams of crack cocaine.  If the FSA applied, 
however, he would be subject to a mandatory minimum of 
five years‟ imprisonment.  Before the District Court, Dixon 
argued that the mandatory minimums set forth in the FSA 
should govern because the Act was in effect on the date of his 
October 25, 2010 sentencing hearing.  The District Court 
disagreed and concluded, in accordance with the 
Government‟s view, that a mandatory minimum term of ten 
years‟ imprisonment was required, based on the provisions of 
the 1986 Act in effect at the time of Dixon‟s offense conduct.  
Accordingly, it imposed a sentence of 121 months‟ 
imprisonment, followed by five years of supervised release 
for the drug crime, and a concurrent sentence of 120 months‟ 
                                              
1
 On June 30, 2011, the Sentencing Commission 
unanimously decided to apply the new Guidelines 
retroactively to defendants sentenced before the Act‟s 
passage.  That decision, however, does not affect the statutory 
mandatory minimums and has no bearing on the resolution of 
the issue before us. 
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imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release 
for the gun crime. 
Dixon filed a timely notice of appeal, arguing that the 
District Court should have applied the FSA to his sentence.  
The issue presented by Dixon‟s appeal is a purely legal one 
over which we exercise plenary review.  See United States v. 
Reevey, 631 F.3d 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2010).  Our jurisdictional 
authority for that review is provided by 29 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
18 U.S.C. § 3742.
2
 
II. 
The issue boils down to this: did Congress intend to 
preserve the mandatory minimum penalties for crack cocaine 
possession set forth in the 1986 Act that it repudiated in the 
FSA, or did it intend for Dixon to have the benefit of the 
ameliorative provisions of the FSA?
3
  We conclude that 
                                              
2
 After oral argument was held in this case, the 
Government submitted a letter to the Court pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j) stating that it had 
reversed its position on the applicability of the FSA to Dixon.  
Before the District Court and, until now, before this Court, 
the Government argued that the Act should not apply to 
defendants whose offense conduct predated the FSA but were 
sentenced after.  Having determined that its previous analysis 
of the Act was in error, the Government now agrees with the 
position set forth by Dixon in this appeal. 
3
 As a threshold issue, we determine that our previous 
decision in United States v. Reevey, 631 F.3d 110 (3d Cir. 
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Congress intended the latter.  The First and Eleventh Circuits 
                                                                                                     
2010), upon which the District Court relied, does not resolve 
the question presented in this appeal.  When considering 
whether a law applies retroactively, the question is always “to 
whom”?  In Reevey, we held that it did not apply retroactively 
to the group comprised of defendants who committed their 
crimes and who were sentenced before the Act was enacted.  
In doing so, we joined every Court of Appeal to consider the 
issue.  See United States v. Doggins, 633 F.3d 379, 384 (5th 
Cir. 2011); United States v. Bell, 624 F.3d 803, 814-15 (7th 
Cir. 2010); United States v. Brewer, 624 F.3d 900, 909 n.7 
(8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Carradine, 621 F.3d 575, 
580 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Lewis, 625 F.3d 1224, 
1228 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Gomes, 621 F.3d 
1343, 1346 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).  The “to whom” 
question here is different.  The issue in this case is whether 
the FSA applies to the separate group of defendants who 
committed their crimes before the Act was enacted, but who 
were sentenced afterwards.  We specifically abstained from 
answering this question in Reevey.  631 F.3d at 115 n.5 
(distinguishing a defendant in Dixon‟s position from Reevey 
because Reevey, unlike Dixon, committed his crime and was 
sentenced before the FSA was enacted).  Our answer to the 
question whether Congress intended to apply the FSA to one 
group – defendants in Reevey‟s position – has no bearing on 
whether Congress intended to apply the FSA to another – 
defendants in Dixon‟s position.  See United States v. Fisher, 
635 F.3d 336, 339 (7th Cir. 2011) (concluding that a case 
similar to Reevey did not control whether the Act applies to 
defendants like Dixon). 
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have agreed.  See United States v. Vera Rojas, -- F.3d --, 2011 
WL 2623579 (11th Cir. July 6, 2011); United States v. 
Douglas, -- F.3d --, 2011 WL 2120163 (1st Cir. May 31, 
2011).  The Seventh Circuit has not.  United States v. Fisher, 
635 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2011), rehearing and rehearing en 
banc denied, -- F.3d --, 2011 WL 2022959 (7th Cir. May 25, 
2011). 
The general common law rule “requires a court „to 
apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, 
unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is 
statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary.‟”  
United States v. Jacobs, 919 F.2d 10, 11 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(quoting Bradley v. School Bd. of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 
711 (1974)).  As a result of the common law rule, once 
Congress amended a criminal statute (including its penalties), 
all pending prosecutions – prosecutions that had not yet 
reached a final judgment in the highest court authorized to 
review them – were abated.  See Bradley v. United States, 410 
U.S. 605, 607-08 (1973).  To avoid this result, Congress 
passed in 1871 what we now call the “general saving statute.”  
See Act of Feb. 25, 1871, ch. 71, § 4, 16 Stat. 431, 432 
(codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 109).  In its current form, 
the statute provides in pertinent part: 
The repeal of any statute shall not have the 
effect to release or extinguish any penalty, 
forfeiture, or liability incurred under such 
statute, unless the repealing Act shall so 
expressly provide, and such statute shall be 
treated as still remaining in force for the 
purpose of sustaining any proper action or 
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prosecution for the enforcement of such 
penalty, forfeiture, or liability. 
1 U.S.C. § 109 (the “Saving Statute”). 
Turning to the issue before us, the common law rule 
mandates that the FSA governs unless the “statutory 
direction” in this case, the Saving Statute, applies.  Stated 
differently, the mandatory minimum penalties in the 1986 Act 
are preserved “unless the repealing Act shall so expressly 
provide[.]”  1 U.S.C. § 109.  Notably, the Saving Statute is “a 
rule of construction . . . to be read and construed as a part of 
all subsequent repealing statutes, in order to give effect to the 
will and intent of Congress.”  Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 
205, 217 (1910). 
At first view, the Saving Statute‟s “express” statement 
requirement would appear to doom Dixon‟s argument, as the 
FSA does not mention retroactivity.  But, the Supreme Court 
has interpreted the Saving Statute in a more limited manner.  
The Saving Statute “cannot justify a disregard of the will of 
Congress as manifested, either expressly or by necessary 
implication, in a subsequent enactment.”  Great N. Ry. Co. v. 
United States, 208 U.S. 452, 465 (1908) (emphasis added).  
The import of this reasoning is that the Saving Statute cannot 
control when preserving repealed penalties would plainly 
conflict with the intent of Congress as expressed in a 
subsequent statute.  To that end, the Saving Statute “must be 
enforced unless, either by express declaration or necessary 
implication, arising from the terms of the law as a whole, it 
results that the legislative mind will be set at naught by giving 
effect to the provisions [of the Saving Statute].”  Id.; see also 
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Warden, Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653, 
659 n.10 (1974) (“But only if [the repealing statute] can be 
said by fair implication or expressly to conflict with [the 
Saving Statute] would there be reason to hold that [the 
repealing statute] superseded [the Saving Statute].”).4 
This reasoning highlights a key principle of Congress‟s 
legislative power under Article I of the Constitution:  “that 
one legislature is competent to repeal any act which a former 
legislature was competent to pass; and that one legislature 
cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature.”  
Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 135 (1810).  To put it another 
way, regardless of what the Saving Statute says, Congress can 
express its desire to apply the FSA to Dixon without using 
“magical passwords” to do so.  Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 
302, 310 (1955) (discussing express statement requirement in 
Administrative Procedure Act); see also Lockhart v. United 
States, 546 U.S. 142, 148 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“We 
have made clear in other cases as well, that an express-
reference or express-statement provision cannot nullify the 
unambiguous import of a subsequent statute.” (citing Great 
N. Ry., 208 U.S. at 465)).  Notwithstanding the absence of a 
statement regarding the temporal application of the FSA, the 
“necessary” or “fair” implication of the text is that Congress 
intended to apply the Act in this situation.
5
 
                                              
4
 Although the repealing laws in Great Northern and 
Marrero contained statute-specific saving clauses, the 
Supreme Court did not limit implied repeals to that instance. 
5
 District Courts within the Third Circuit have 
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Although Dixon points to legislative history and 
statements from members of Congress to support his 
argument, there is no need to rely on these sources.  
Congress‟s intent is discernable from the text of the Act itself.  
First, Congress‟s emergency directive to the Sentencing 
Commission in Section 8 to “make such conforming 
amendments” that would “achieve consistency with other 
guideline provisions and applicable law” demonstrates that 
Congress wanted the mandatory minimums in the FSA to 
apply to sentences handed down as of its effective date.  
“Applicable law” must be the FSA, not the 1986 Act, because 
                                                                                                     
misinterpreted our decision in United States v. Jacobs, 919 
F.2d 10 (3d Cir. 1990), as requiring an express statement of 
retroactivity and prohibiting consideration of congressional 
intent in deciding whether to apply the FSA to defendants in 
Dixon‟s position.  See, e.g., United States v. Dickey, 759 F. 
Supp. 2d 654, 659-60 (W.D. Pa. 2011); United States v. 
Burgess, No. 09-150, 2010 WL 5437265, at *2 (W.D. Pa. 
Dec. 27, 2010); United States v. Crews, 755 F. Supp. 2d 666, 
671 (W.D. Pa. 2010).  In Jacobs, the defendant argued that 
the legislative history of the repealed statute should be 
relevant to whether the new statute saved the old penalty.  See 
919 F.2d at 12.  Rejecting this argument, Jacobs made clear 
that the legislative history of the repealed law was of no 
relevance to the analysis.  See id. at 13.  Instead, the proper 
point of reference is the repealing statute.  Jacobs did not 
hold that an express statement regarding retroactivity was 
required.  Further, the decision did not address the “necessary 
implication” analysis and is no bar to concluding that the FSA 
applies to Dixon. 
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Congress sought to bring the Guidelines in conformity with 
the 18:1 ratio in the FSA.  As such, during the time period 
when the Sentencing Commission revised the Guidelines, the 
FSA provided the “applicable law” against which those 
amendments were modeled. 
Significantly, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
prompts district courts to apply the Guidelines “in effect on 
the date the defendant is sentenced[.]”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii).  Legislating against this backdrop, 
Congress knew that the amended Guidelines would apply at 
the date of sentencing, regardless of when the offense 
occurred.  Section 8 of the Act speaks of promoting 
“consistency” between the Guidelines and the statute.  FSA 
§ 8.  This evinces an intent to apply the FSA to sentences 
given as of its effective date, just as the Guidelines would be.  
The mandate in Section 8 would not make sense if the new 
mandatory minimums are not in accord with the Guidelines 
because, regardless of the Commission‟s actions, the old 
mandatory minimums would always trump the new 
Guidelines for the large number of defendants whose 
Guidelines ranges are below the mandatory minimum.  See 
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) (“Where a statutorily required minimum 
sentence is greater than the maximum of the applicable 
guideline range, the statutorily required minimum sentence 
shall be the guideline sentence.”).  The Eleventh Circuit in 
Rojas also recognized the mismatch that occurs when failing 
to apply the Act in this instance, namely, “the necessary and 
fair implication of the FSA is that Congress intended the Act 
to apply to all sentencings going forward, because a contrary 
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conclusion would be logically inconsistent and would achieve 
absurd results[.]”  2011 WL 2623579, Slip Op. at 10. 
The Seventh Circuit in Fisher disagreed with this 
analysis, noting that “if Congress wanted the FSA or the 
guideline amendments to apply to not-yet-sentenced 
defendants convicted on pre-FSA conduct, it would have at 
least dropped a hint to that effect somewhere in the text of the 
FSA, perhaps in its charge to the Sentencing Commission.”  
635 F.3d at 339-40.  This reasoning, however, ignores the text 
of Section 8 and fails to meaningfully explain why Congress 
would direct new Guidelines to be employed on an 
emergency basis, yet at the same time would desire that the 
Guidelines have a diminished impact due to the continued 
application of the old mandatory minimums.  Refusing to 
apply the mandatory minimums in the FSA eviscerates the 
very consistency and conformity that the statute requires.  In 
other words, the Guidelines cannot “conform[]” and “achieve 
consistency” with the FSA if the Act does not apply to all 
sentencing proceedings as of August 3, 2010.  This leads to 
an incongruous result that puts district courts in the odd 
position of having to apply Guidelines implemented to 
“achieve consistency with . . . applicable law” to cases in 
which the “applicable law” was not applicable.  The directive 
to the Sentencing Commission signifies that Congress desired 
congruence between the FSA and the Guidelines. 
Moreover, Congress‟s “emergency” directive is 
unnecessary if it did not intend to apply the FSA immediately 
because the old mandatory minimums would still control in 
many cases.  See Fisher, 2011 WL 2022959, at *2 (Williams 
and Hamilton, JJ., dissenting from the denial of rehearing and 
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rehearing en banc) (“Congress‟s mandate in section 8 would 
not have made much sense if Congress did not intend the FSA 
to apply to defendants in Dorsey‟s situation because, 
regardless of what the Commission promulgated, the new 
guidelines would simply look to the old statutory 
minimums.”).  The urgency Congress expressed through 
ordering the Sentencing Commission to promulgate new 
Guidelines demonstrates its intent to apply the FSA without 
delay.  The Rojas Court echoed this conclusion.  See 2011 
WL 2623579, Slip Op. at 10 (“By granting the Sentencing 
Commission the emergency authority to amend the 
Sentencing Guidelines by November 1, 2010, Congress 
necessarily indicated its intent for the FSA to apply 
immediately.”).  Continuing to apply the repealed mandatory 
minimums in the 1986 Act is directly in tension with 
Congress‟s emergency dictate, and, we believe, an erroneous 
reading of the statute. 
And, notably, the statute of limitations for drug 
offenses is five years.  18 U.S.C. § 3282(a).  Refusing to 
apply the FSA to defendants like Dixon would lead to a 
troubling result in which the Act would have little real effect 
for years, until the statute of limitations runs on pre-August 3, 
2010 conduct.  For example, a defendant could be indicted on 
August 2, 2015, for conduct occurring on August 2, 2010, and 
still be subject to the mandatory minimum penalties that 
Congress sought to eradicate by “restor[ing] fairness to 
Federal cocaine sentencing” in 2010.  FSA, Preamble.  
Congress could not have intended such a bizarre outcome.  
Indeed, “[i]t seems unrealistic to suppose that Congress 
strongly desired to put 18:1 guidelines in effect by November 
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1 even for crimes committed before the FSA but balked at 
giving the same defendants the benefit of the newly enacted 
18:1 mandatory minimums.”  Douglas, 2011 WL 2120163, at 
*4.  Although district courts have been divided on the issue, 
many have likewise agreed that the FSA applies to defendants 
similarly situated to Dixon.  See United States v. Watts, -- F. 
Supp. 2d --, 2011 WL 1282542, at *11 (D. Mass. Apr. 5, 
2011) (collecting cases). 
 Second, Congress‟s direction to the Sentencing 
Commission in Section 10 to study the effects of the FSA 
drives home the point.  If the FSA‟s provisions only apply to 
post-August 3, 2010 conduct, defendants sentenced in the 
coming years will be subject to the mandatory minimums in 
the 1986 Act.  Consequently, during the time period in which 
the Sentencing Commission is supposed to produce a report 
on the effects of the FSA, the Act often will be inapplicable.  
This anomaly frustrates the ability of the Sentencing 
Commission to compile a report on the impact of changes as a 
result of the FSA.  Why would Congress commission a study 
on a statute during a period in which it would not consistently 
apply?  This report “would be incomplete, at best, and 
incomprehensible, at worst, if the FSA were not yet being 
uniformly applied until after the report was due.”  United 
States v. Brown, No. 10-0135, 2011 WL 2457933, at *3 
(W.D. Pa. June 16, 2011). 
 Finally, the title and stated purpose of the FSA confirm 
that Dixon should be sentenced according to its terms.  In 
plainly seeking to “restore fairness” to sentencing, Congress 
intended to apply the Act to all sentences rendered as of the 
Act‟s passage.  Declining to do so begs the question of “what 
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possible reason could there be to want judges to continue to 
impose new sentences that are not „fair‟ over the next five 
years while the statute of limitations runs?”  United States v. 
Douglas, 746 F. Supp. 2d 220, 229 (D. Me. 2010) (emphasis 
in original).  District courts have struggled mightily with the 
prospect of perpetuating a sentencing regime that Congress 
has explicitly decried as unjust.  See, e.g., Watts, 2011 WL 
1282542, at *1 (“It is disturbing enough when courts, whose 
primary task is to do justice, become themselves the 
instruments of injustice . . . But this discomfort reaches its 
zenith when the injustice has been identified and formally 
remedied by Congress itself.” (emphasis in original)); United 
States v. Elder, No. 1:10-CR-132, 2011 WL 294507, at *6 
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 27, 2011) (“For the Court to continue to 
impose sentences that are contrary to the statute that Congress 
itself described as „An Act to restore fairness to Federal 
cocaine sentencing‟ would be an absurd result.”).  This 
sentiment is well-founded, as refusing to apply the FSA is, 
indeed, fundamentally unfair.  There is no compelling reason 
to reach a contrary conclusion.  Because the “plain import of 
a later statute,” here, the FSA, “directly conflicts with an 
earlier statute,” namely, the Saving Statute‟s attempted 
preservation of the mandatory minimum penalties in the 1986 
Act, the FSA controls “regardless of its compliance with any 
earlier-enacted requirement of an express reference or other 
„magical password.‟”  Lockhart, 546 U.S. at 149 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (emphasis in original). 
III. 
We hold that the FSA requires application of the new 
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions to all defendants 
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sentenced on or after August 3, 2010, regardless of when the 
offense conduct occurred.  “[T]he terms of the law as a 
whole,” Great N. Ry., 208 U.S. at 465, namely the Act‟s grant 
of emergency authority to the Sentencing Commission and 
the desire to achieve “consistency” through “conforming” 
amendments, in conjunction with the directive in the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 to apply the Guidelines in 
effect on the day of sentencing, lead to the inescapable 
conclusion that Congress intended to apply the FSA to Dixon.  
This interpretation of the Act comports with its stated purpose 
to restore fairness to federal cocaine sentencing.  To conclude 
otherwise would frustrate this goal and set “the legislative 
mind . . . at naught.”  Id.  Accordingly, we will vacate the 
judgment of the District Court and remand so that Dixon may 
be sentenced in accordance with the terms of the FSA. 
